While standard models assume households have no trouble planning for retirement, some researchers have argued that households vary in their propensity to plan and that the degree of retirement planning is a key determinant of household saving (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007) . As a result, there is signi…cant world-wide e¤ort to measure and improve …nancial literacy and retirement planning. To our knowledge, this paper is the …rst to quantify the welfare gains associated with improved retirement planning. We …nd that a modest increase in a household's planning horizon by just a few years, so that the household begins planning for retirement a few years earlier than otherwise, provides welfare gains that can be as large as the gains traditionally ascribed to the elimination of business cycles and idiosyncratic risks. Given the size of these welfare gains, we believe that e¤orts to improve …nancial literacy and retirement planning are worth the utmost attention of economists, policymakers, and educators.
Introduction
Typical households appear to struggle when it comes to preparing for retirement. A common mistake is waiting too long to get started. Studies document and intuition suggests an important connection between the degree of retirement planning and the level of saving at retirement; and, low levels of …nancial literacy appear to be one reason why many households fail to plan very far into the future (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007 , 2008 , 2009 . 1 As a result, Lusardi, Mitchell, and many others are part of a world-wide e¤ort to measure …nancial literacy and to teach and encourage people to prepare more e¢ ciently for their retirement years.
2 In this paper we seek to quantify the welfare gains associated with improved retirement planning. In particular, we ask the following question: How large are the welfare gains from a modest increase in the length of the household planning horizon? Our answer: the welfare gains are large by typical standards.
We arrive at this conclusion by studying the dynamically-inconsistent model of Caliendo and Aadland (2007) . Individuals in this model make plans that span a short horizon, but then they abandon those plans as age advances and the planning horizon slides forward along the time scale. Essentially, an individual goes through the early stages of the life cycle without even thinking about retirement. Yet eventually his planning horizon slides across the retirement threshold and more and more of the retirement period comes into view. The individual reacts by planning and saving aggressively before it is too late. Such sub-optimal retirement planning sharply contrasts with the standard neoclassical model in which the individual begins planning the moment he enters the workforce, though it is consistent with Campbell's (2006 Campbell's ( , p. 1554 view that mistakes in household …nancial decision making "are central to the …eld of household …nance"and with the …nding that many Americans have not given much thought to retirement planning even when they are 50+ years of age (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007 , 2008 . In sum, the short horizon model is a convenient, reduced form construct to study imperfections and improvements in retirement planning.
We assume individuals di¤er according to the length of their planning horizons and we calibrate the distribution of planning horizons so that the current US social security tax rate of 10.6% is in fact the optimal tax rate for the model economy. This calibration strategy ensures that the welfare gains from operating a social security program are maximized: a benevolent policymaker recognizes that people struggle when it comes to retirement planning, knows the distribution of planning horizons, and designs a social security program to best 1 For example, Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) show that Baby Boomers who understand the e¤ects of compound interest are more likely to plan ahead for retirement and in turn tend to accumulate more …nancial wealth. The impact of …nancial literacy on planning persists even after controlling for many key demographic factors, and the impact of planning on wealth accumulation likewise survives even after controlling for many of the conventional determinants of household saving. For similar results see Lusardi (1999 Lusardi ( , 2002 Lusardi ( , 2003 Lusardi ( , 2008 , Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003) , and van Rooij, Alessie (2011, 2012 ) among many others. 2 We cannot adequately describe all the details of this major e¤ort in this short paper. We direct readers to the Financial Literacy Center, whose mission is "to develop and test innovative programs to improve …nancial literacy and promote informed …nancial decisionmaking,"to the OECD Financial Education Project to improve …nancial literacy among member countries, and to the Jump$tart Coalition for Personal Financial Literacy which is "dedicated to improving the …nancial literacy of pre-kindergarten through college-age youth by providing advocacy, research, standards and educational resources." cope with this problem. By maximizing the welfare gains that can come from social security, we are intentionally understating the welfare gains that come from better retirement planning since social security is already optimally calibrated to combat shortsightedness. Yet, even with this bias in place, we still …nd signi…cant welfare gains from better retirement planning. For instance, the aggregate welfare gain from a modest increase in the mean planning horizon from 5 to 10 years, so that the average individual starts saving at age 55 rather than at age 60, is equivalent to 2% of aggregate consumption. By conventional macroeconomic standards, this is a large welfare gain given that it is as large or larger than the gains traditionally ascribed to eliminating business cycle ‡uctuations (Lucas 2003) and idiosyncratic health and …nancial risks (Vidangos 2008) .
We interpret our paper as a companion to Lusardi, Michaud, and Mitchell (2011) . Unlike our time-inconsistent setting, they construct a time-consistent model where …nancial literacy is an endogenous variable. Households invest time and monetary resources to become more …nancially literate, and literacy increases the expected returns on risky stocks. They conduct a policy experiment which compares wealth holdings in a world with heterogeneity in …nancial literacy to an ideal world in which everyone is …nancially sophisticated (or at least has free access to a …nancial advisor). They …nd that …nancial literacy has the potential to generate very large gains in wealth accumulation and also has the potential to reduce wealth di¤erences across education groups. Just like Lusardi, Michaud, and Mitchell, we too show that improved …nancial literacy and hence better retirement planning can generate large welfare gains, though we come to this conclusion with a very di¤erent model. Taken together, the two papers tell a consistent story: whether it is the costly (and rational) acquisition of …nancial literacy that prevents households from obtaining the …rst-best consumption/saving allocations as in Lusardi, Michaud, and Mitchell, or whether it is timeinconsistent shortsightedness that prevents households from reaching the …rst best as in our paper, improvements in …nancial literacy and retirement planning can have large economic consequences in theoretical models.
Of course, documenting large welfare gains from more e¢ cient retirement planning (as we have done in this paper) is the easy part. The hard part is to …gure out exactly how to induce such behavior. We leave it to Lusardi, Mitchell, and other experts to develop and test the e¤ectiveness of …nancial education mechanisms and to identify low cost methods of delivery. Our purpose is to provide a theoretical foundation to help justify their e¤orts. 
Model
In this section we add two features to the short-term planning model of Caliendo and Aadland (2007) . We add a social security program and we add heterogeneity in planning horizons. Findley and Caliendo (2009) add these features as well, and they endogenize factor prices. Here we focus our attention on an endowment economy, which biases our welfare gains downward because better retirement planning would have the added e¤ect of higher GDP in a production economy. In this sense, our results can be interpreted as a lower bound on the welfare e¤ects of improved retirement planning. Neither of these other papers examine the question that we consider in this study.
Age is continuous and is indexed by t. All individuals start work at t = 0, retire at t = T , and pass away at t = T . They receive the real economy-wide wage w for t 2 [0; T ] and pay social security taxes at rate . With R workers for every retiree in the economy, pay-as-you-go social security bene…ts are b = R w for t 2 [T; T ]. Consumption is c(t), and savings k(t) grows at rate r. We assume k(0) = k( T ) = 0. Finally, there is no economic or population growth, so R = T =( T T ).
The length of an individual's planning horizon is x, which varies across the population according to the density function f Phase 1 is the portion of the working period for which retirement is not yet in view. Phase 2 is the portion of the working period when retirement is in view. Phase 3 is the portion of the retirement period when the planning horizon does not yet reach all the way to the date of death. And, Phase 4 is the portion of the retirement period when the date of death is in sight. The degree to which individuals plan for retirement is a function of how early they transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2.
At every age t 0 2 [0; T ] the agent makes a consumption/saving plan that spans a short horizon t 2 [t 0 ; minft 0 + x; T g]:
where is the discount rate, subject to the law of motion
and boundary conditions
The solution to this problem is the planned consumption path for t 2 [t 0 ; minft 0 + x; T g]. But this model features time-inconsistent dynamic optimization during Phases 1 through 3 since the individual's planned consumption program continues to become invalid and suboptimal with the progression of time as his short planning horizon slides forward along the time scale. The actual consumption program is the envelope of in…nitely many initial values from a continuum of planned time paths. Because this mathematical procedure is already described in Caliendo and Aadland (2007) and Findley and Caliendo (2009) , we suppress the details of deriving the planned paths and the details of converting the planned paths into the actual paths. In the Appendix we report the closed-form consumption paths actually followed. We assume the goal of a benevolent policymaker is to select the social security tax rate to maximize utilitarian life-cycle welfare. 4 Therefore, arg max
subject to the given distribution of planning horizons
and subject to individual decision making c(t) de…ned by problem (1)- (5). (8) This completes the description of our model.
Quantitative Experiments

Calibration
All individuals start work at age 25, retire at 65, and pass away at 80. Therefore we set T = 40 and T = 55. The wage rate is normalized to w = 1. We set the interest and discount rates to the same value r = = 3:5%, and we assume = 1:25. Our calibration strategy is to choose the parameters of the density function f (x) so that from the policymaker's problem above equals the actual tax rate of 10.6% in the US. The values x = 1, x + = 15, = 1:52, and = 0:22 deliver = 10:47%, which is quite close to the target rate. The mean of the density is 5 years at this calibration.
Note that our calibration strategy makes the welfare gains from social security as large as possible: the benevolent policymaker understands that people struggle when it comes to retirement planning, knows the distribution of planning horizons, and then designs the social security program to best cope with this problem.
5 By maximizing the welfare gains that can come from social security, we are intentionally understating the welfare gains from better retirement planning because social security is already optimally calibrated to combat shortsightedness. For example, if we set the social security tax and bene…t levels at values that are smaller than the optimal pay-as-you-go levels, then an increase in the length of the planning horizon would have an even larger welfare e¤ect than what we report below.
Aggregate Welfare
Our …rst experiment is to compute the aggregate welfare gains from an increase in the length of the average planning horizon, holding the variance of the planning horizon …xed and holding …xed the social security tax rate at its baseline level. We consider a modest increase from a mean planning horizon of 5 to a mean of 10 (see Figure 1) , which occurs when = 9:2071 and = 0:0989. This implies that the average individual starts saving at age 55 rather than waiting until age 60 to start saving.
While most …nancial education initiatives aim at larger improvements than this, we …nd that such a modest increase in the mean planning horizon provides a large aggregate welfare gain. The compensating variation (CV)-the percentage increase in the consumption of individuals of all ages and planning horizons in the baseline calibration (mean 5) that is required to match the aggregate welfare associated with longer horizons (mean 10)-is 1:9%. Figure 2 shows the aggregate consumption pro…les in this experiment and highlights the better consumption smoothing that comes from improvements in the average horizon length. 6 The CV remains signi…cant even for smaller improvements in retirement planning; for example, if the mean horizon increases from 5 to 8, then the CV is still above 1%.
To put these calculations into context, recall that the welfare gains typically ascribed to the elimination of business cycle ‡uctuations (Lucas 2003) as well as the gains from eliminating idiosyncratic shocks to health, unemployment, and wage income (Vidangos 2008) are similar in magnitude to the gains that we report. Thus, even if policymakers design a social security system that captures all available welfare gains along this policy dimension, a modest increase in the mean planning horizon can still be as valuable as the gains that come from eliminating key macro and microeconomic risks that have received so much attention from researchers and policymakers.
We also consider a second aggregate experiment to illustrate the value of better retirement planning. Consider the counterfactual case in which there is no social security program in place. We now iterate over ( ; ) ordered pairs until we achieve the same social welfare conferred by an optimal social security program, subject to the constraint that the variance of x stays the same as in the baseline parameterization. Holding the variance …xed allows us to focus on the compensating change to the mean planning horizon. This exercise produces = 7:2728 and = 0:1158, which implies a new mean planning horizon of 8.62 years. Thus, a modest increase in the length of the mean planning horizon (3.62 years)-so that the average individual starts saving at about age 56 rather than age 60-would produce welfare gains equal to the gains conferred by operating a social security program with an optimal replacement rate.
Individual Welfare
In this section we disaggregate the welfare e¤ects of better retirement planning to understand the full distribution of the individual welfare gains. Of course, an increase in the planning horizon will be welfare improving as long as the planning horizon falls short of the full lifespan. But the gains to better retirement planning are non-linear in the initial planning horizon. Figure 3 is a contour plot of the individual welfare gains from an increase in the planning horizon from x to x 0 , for many values of x and x 0 . The contour lines represent the individual CV, which is the percentage increase in consumption across the entire life cycle that is required to bring the lifetime utility of an individual with horizon x up to the level of utility when the horizon is x 0 > x. This …gure illustrates that the large aggregate welfare gains from better planning are driven primarily by those with the shortest planning horizons. For instance, a 5 year increase in the planning horizon (as in the aggregate welfare calculations above) translates to a CV of 2.6% if the initial planning horizon is x = 1 but the CV is 1.0% if x = 10. Clearly, the aggregate welfare gains reported above are tilted primarily toward those with the shortest horizons. It is not particularly surprising that the gains to better retirement planning exhibit diminishing returns. Yet what is important is that even those with longer horizons (10 years) can also bene…t signi…cantly from modest improvements in planning.
Conclusion
The welfare gains from modest improvements in retirement planning are signi…cant in our model. Even if the social security program is optimally calibrated to combat sub-optimal retirement planning, small improvements in planning can still generate welfare gains on the order of 2% of aggregate consumption. To put this into context, the welfare gains from modest improvements in retirement planning are similar to (or larger than) the gains typically ascribed to the elimination of business cycle ‡uctuations (Lucas 2003) as well as the gains from eliminating idiosyncratic shocks to health, unemployment, and wage income (Vidangos 2008) . Given the volume of e¤ort spent studying these topics and the …nancial resources publicly committed to capturing the gains from eliminating such uncertainty, it seems quite reasonable to conclude that societies should also identify e¢ cient methods of delivering …nancial education to harness the large welfare gains from better retirement planning. 
